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1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the decision by the Appellate Body (AB) regard-
ing measures affecting the importation of apples in Japan. Section 2 of
the chapter presents some background facts. Section 3 considers the
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement and emphasizes the
fact that it imposes a discipline on risk-reducing measures even in
the absence of discrimination or protectionism. Section 4 discusses how
the evaluation of risk-reducing measures can be undertaken in the
context of the SPS agreement. Our discussion focuses on two issues: the
scope of the mandate given to the adjudicators and the standard of
review that they should apply. We emphasize the difficulty of the task
faced by the adjudicators, namely to distinguish between determining
the level of risk that a country will find optimal to support (which
cannot be challenged) and determining whether risk-reducing measures
are necessary to achieve the chosen level of risk. We further observe that
the common methodology used by Panels, namely to evaluate the
existence of risk in the absence of risk-reducing measures, has limited
applicability. We also discuss how this approach can be abused, leading
the adjudicators to slip from an evaluation of whether the measures are
necessary to achieve a given level of risk to an implicit challenge
of the level of risk itself (which should remain the preserve of
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the Members). Regarding the standard of review, we argue that
a lower standard should be applied to measures that do not threaten
fundamental principles like nondiscrimination. Section 5 considers the
approach and the findings of the Panel and the AB in light of this
discussion. Section 6 discusses the consistency requirement imposed
by the SPS agreement regarding risk-reducing measures in different
circumstances and argues that it can be a very effective tool to prevent
abusive standards, without compromising the autonomy of the States
in setting the optimal level of risk that they wish to bear. This section
also discusses some of the implications of applying different standards
of review to cases that involve discrimination or protectionism and
those that do not. Section 7 briefly considers how the Panel and the
AB handled methods of risk assessment, and highlights the fact that
Japan was held to a very high standard of review. Section 8 discusses
the approach of the Panel and the AB toward the precaution principle.
We consider the precautionary principle in the context of the
SPS agreement and argue that the agreement fits naturally with the
distinction between risk and ambiguity and in this perspective allows for
one type of rationale behind the precautionary principle (while
seemingly excluding others). We also observe that there is at least one
issue in which scientific evidence was ambiguous in the case.
Accordingly, the Panel’s and the AB’s unwillingness to apply the
precautionary principle in this case can be questioned.
2 The dispute’s factual matrix
The disease targeted by Japan’s phytosanitary measure in this dispute1
is called ‘‘fire blight,’’ often referred to by the scientific name for its
bacterium, Erwinia amylovora or E. amylovora. The AB in its decision
offers a useful summation of the case, which we employ here. Fruits
infected by fire blight exude bacterial ooze, which is transmitted
primarily through wind and/or rain and by insects or birds to open
flowers on the same or new host plants. The bacteria E. amylovora
multiply externally on the stigmas of these open flowers and enter the
plant through various openings. In addition to the apple fruit, hosts
of fire blight include pears, quince, and loquats, as well as several garden
plants. Scientific evidence establishes, as the Panel found, that the
1 We are relying on the synoptic presentation of the facts by the AB itself in WT/DS245/
AB/R of 26 November 2003.
japan  measures affecting the importation of apples 281
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745606001479
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:38:36, subject to the Cambridge Core
risk of introduction and spread of fire blight varies considerably
according to the host plant.
The uncontested history of fire blight reveals significant transoceanic
dissemination in the 200-plus years since its discovery. E. amylovora,
first reported in the New York State in the United States in 1793,
is believed to be native to North America. By the early 1900s, fire
blight had been reported in Canada from Ontario to British Columbia,
in Northern Mexico, and in the United States from the East Coast to
California and the Pacific Northwest. Fire blight was reported in
New Zealand in 1919, in Great Britain in 1957, and in Egypt in 1964.
The disease has spread across much of Europe, to varying degrees,
depending on the country, and also through the Mediterranean region.
In 1997, Australia reported the presence of fire blight, but eradication
efforts were successful and no further outbreaks have been reported.
With respect to the incidence of fire blight in Japan, the parties disputed
before the Panel whether fire blight had ever entered Japan; but
the United States assumed, for purposes of this dispute, that Japan was,
as it claimed, free of fire blight and fire blight bacteria. It might be
added that Japan wished to remain free of the blight. It should also
be noted that Japan’s claim that the precise pathway of the pathogen
across the Pacific was unknown, was neither contested before nor
found to be wrong by the Panel or the AB. It is probably correct that
the transoceanic pathway is still unknown. Nonetheless, that claim
was, apparently, assumed to be irrelevant.
According to the United States, Japan instituted nine measures to
preclude contamination:
(a) The prohibition of imported apples from US states other than
apples produced in designated areas in the states of Oregon or
Washington;
(b) the prohibition of imported apples from orchards in which
any fire blight is detected on plants or in which host plants of
fire blight (other than apple trees) are found, whether or not
infected;
(c) the prohibition of imported apples from any orchard (whether or
not it is free of fire blight) should fire blight be detected within
a 500-meter buffer zone surrounding such orchard;
(d) the requirement that export orchards be inspected three times yearly
(at blossom, fruitlet, and harvest stages) for the presence of fire
blight for purposes of applying the abovementioned prohibitions;
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(e) a post-harvest surface treatment of apples for export with chlorine;
(f) production requirements, such as chlorine treatment of containers
for harvesting and chlorine treatment of the packing facility;
(g) post-harvest separation of apples for export to Japan from fruits
destined to other markets;
(h) certification by the US plant protection officials that fruits are
free of fire blight and have been treated post-harvest with
chlorine; and
(i) confirmation by Japanese officials of the US officials’ certification
and inspection by Japanese officials of disinfection and packaging
facilities.
The United States claimed that the only products exported from
the United States to Japan were ‘‘Mature, Symptomless’’ apples that
presented no risk of pathogenic transmission, and that therefore,
in relation to this product, the measures in question violated the SPS,
notably Arts. 2(2) and 5(1).
The Panel consolidated all Japanese measures into one, but accepted
that, although officially only mature, symptomless apples were
exported, other immature, symptomatic apples had to be presumed to
be part of the trade through fraud and error, and that consequently,
the Japanese measures would have to be assessed in relation to both
groups.
3 SPS  objectives and rationale
This case is not considered doctrinally path-breaking or economically
problematic. In it, the AB seemed to consolidate and refine, rather
than revise, its previous SPS jurisprudence. It is thus a good case to
understand the run-of-the-mill SPS physiognomy. Notable in this case
is the fact that, yet again, even such a technologically sophisticated
country as Japan was unable to comply with the requirement of risk
assessment.
The SPS measures existed, of course, before the adoption of the
SPS Agreement. Naturally they would be subject to the traditional
GATT disciplines notably Arts, III and XX.2 In some respects, the
2 Article XI would, of course, also apply to SPS measures; but as is well known,
the combination of the grandfathering provisions of the GATT and the Ad Note to
Art. III, meant that most SPS type measures would normally be reviewed in the context
of Art. III.
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interpretative community of the GATT/WTO  governments, adjudi-
cators, lawyers, and economists, etc.  is ‘‘hard-wired’’ to the underly-
ing objective and rationale of Art. III: separating those State measures
that are genuinely instituted to protect against risk to human, animals,
and plants from those that, by design or otherwise, are there to protect
domestic production and cannot be justified in full or in part on
legitimate SPS grounds.
At the heart of the SPS Agreement, and one of the principal sources
of the difficulties inherent in its interpretation and application, is
its apparent addition to the traditional ‘‘discrimination’’ or ‘‘protec-
tionism’’ rationale of GATT disciplines (which SPS still maintains3)
of a second ‘‘unjustified obstacle’’ rationale that goes beyond Art. XI
measures. The principal locus of the new ‘‘obstacle’’ rationale is to
be found in Art. 2(2) SPS and those provisions that flow from it,
notably Art. 5.
Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is
applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life
or health, is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without
sufficient scientific evidence, except as provided for in paragraph 7 or
Article 5.
As stated above, the consequence of Art. 2(2) is that Members
may have in place or institute an SPS measure that has neither the
object nor the effect of favoring domestic products  indeed, there
might not even be a domestic product to compete with the import
in question  and yet have such a measure challenged and found
incompatible with SPS discipline because, for example, it places an
undue burden on producers in the exporting State. If a State cannot
show that its phytosanitary measures are really necessary for safety
and health, as defined by science, those measures simply cannot stand.
Further, the State’s established procedures for risk assessment must
now themselves comply with a WTO discipline.
In its field of application, SPS represents a dramatic shift, similar
(though not identical) to that occurring in the EC in 1974 with the
European Court of Justice’s clarification in the Dassonville case that
the prohibition of measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative
restrictions applied to nondiscriminatory measures. The rationale for
3 Art. 2(3) SPS.
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the broad shift in Dassonville and the more limited but similar shift
in the SPS agreement is the realization that, in the area of regulatory
measures designed to protect against risk, there apparently exist many
instances of ‘‘inappropriate’’ State measures that unnecessarily create
obstacles to trade without serving the rationale of health or safety,
and that these measures may exist without protectionist intent or
effect. Note that even under the pre-SPS GATT regime, it was quite
common to find State measures failing the test of proportionality
and least-restrictive-measure, i.e. they were found to be excessive for
their declared purpose. But they were always found to be so in the
context of a complaint alleging discrimination and protectionism and
as part of the proof of such alleged discrimination and protectionism.
Under SPS, a complaint may be brought, as in Apples or in Hormones,
without the need to allege or prove any degree of protectionism or
discrimination.
One can wonder about the type of circumstances in which this
discipline may apply. First, in the absence of a protectionist motive,
the States may have an incentive to apply more stringent standards
to imported products than to domestic products. This circumstance
arises because the cost of meeting the standards raises the producers’
marginal cost, but the cost increase is typically not fully passed
on to consumers (except in extreme cases of perfect competition).
Profits also fall. A State will not take foreign profits into account
when designing health standards, but it will consider domestic profits.
Hence, standards applicable to product categories that are imported
will be more stringent (more costly at the margin for a given health
benefit) than standards applicable to domestic product categories.
Standards applicable to product categories that are both imported
and produced domestically will fall in between. Overall, States thus
have an incentive to impose higher standards when the cost of
meeting the standard is partly borne by foreigners. By imposing
some consistency in standards across different product categories
(Art. 5.5), the SPS agreement will prevent the States from doing
this. Second, the impression is given that the States might burden
themselves unnecessarily by adopting excessive or ‘‘inappropriate’’
measures because of deficient methodologies of risk assessment,
perhaps because of their limited ability to conduct appropriate risk
assessment.
In this essay we want to focus on a particular dimension of
the SPS Agreement, namely its application in the context where
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neither discrimination nor protectionism is the center of the inquiry.4
Our underlying thesis is that the implication of the shift from a
‘‘discrimination’’ type of inquiry to an ‘‘obstacle’’ type of inquiry
has not been fully worked out by Panels and the AB.
4 On the evaluation of risk and risk-reducing measures
Members are entitled to adopt appropriate SPS measures that reduce
risk. But when may a Panel determine that an SPS measure is
‘‘inappropriate’’? In order to clarify the task of the adjudicators,
it is useful to consider a situation involving ‘‘risk’’ as one in which
several outcomes could arise in the future. To simplify exposition, we
can focus on two outcomes: a bad outcome (B) and a good outcome
(G). Let us also assume that the likelihood that each outcome will
4 The following is the preamble to the SPS, which articulates its principal objectives:
Reaffirming that no Member should be prevented from adopting or enforcing measures
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, subject to the requirement
that these measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Members where the same conditions
prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade;
Desiring to improve the human health, animal health and phytosanitary situation in
all Members;
Noting that sanitary and phytosanitary measures are often applied on the basis of bilateral
agreements or protocols;
Desiring the establishment of a multilateral framework of rules and disciplines to guide
the development, adoption and enforcement of sanitary and phytosanitary measures in
order to minimize their negative effects on trade;
Recognizing the important contribution that international standards, guidelines and
recommendations can make in this regard;
Desiring to further the use of harmonized sanitary and phytosanitary measures between
Members, on the basis of international standards, guidelines and recommendations
developed by the relevant international organizations, including the Codex
Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, and the relevant
international and regional organizations operating within the framework of the
International Plant Protection Convention, without requiring Members to change
their appropriate level of protection of human, animal or plant life or health;
Recognizing that developing country Members may encounter special difficulties
in complying with the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of importing Members,
and as a consequence in access to markets, and also in the formulation and application
of sanitary or phytosanitary measures in their own territories, and desiring to assist
them in their endeavours in this regard;
Desiring therefore to elaborate rules for the application of the provisions of GATT 1994
which relate to the use of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, in particular the
provisions of Art. XX(b).
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prevail can be assessed in terms of probabilities, so that B arises with
a probability p and G arises with a probability ( 1p ). In some
circumstances, it may be difficult to formulate these probabilities, for
instance, when there are competing theories regarding the development
of a disease. We will discuss below (in Section 8) how decisions should
be made in those circumstances, which involve some ‘‘ambiguity,’’
and how the SPS agreement treats such ambiguity. For the time being,
we assume that probabilities can be estimated.
It is also useful to distinguish between the level of risk that
will prevail in the absence of any risk-reducing measures and the level
of risk that a State will consider desirable. This can be formulated in
terms of probabilities; let p be the probability that a bad outcome
will arise in the absence of any risk-reducing measures. The level
of risk that a State will want to enforce (will consider as optimal)
can be denoted p.
In this context there arise two questions, which feature prominently
in the case. First, what is the mandate of the Panel? Second, what
standard of review should the Panels adopt?
4.1 The mandate of the adjudicator
What is the mandate of the Panel? Is the Panel meant to question the
level of risk that the State wishes to enforce (i.e. p)? Or is it simply
meant to question the measure that has been adopted in order
to achieve this level of risk? The AB has consistently insisted that
Members retain the autonomy to set their own level of acceptable
risk, which may differ from one Member to another (see, for instance,
Australian Salmon5 and Hormones). Article 4(1) is premised on this
primordial understanding:
Members shall accept the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other
Members as equivalent, even if these measures differ from their own or
from those used by other Members trading in the same product, if the
exporting Member objectively demonstrates to the importing Member
that its measures achieve the importing Member’s appropriate level of
sanitary or phytosanitary protection.
Obviously, Art. 4(1) contemplates a situation where the levels of SPS
protection may differ.
5 See, e.g. AB in Australian Salmon, paragraph 125.
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Hence, it appears that the mandate of the Panel is limited to
the evaluation of whether the disputed measures are necessary in order
to achieve the desired level of risk, and, in particular, whether these
measures are supported by scientific evidence.
Before discussing how the Panel and the AB approached this
mandate, a few remarks on the level of risk absent any measure (p),
the optimal (desired) level of risk (p), and risk-reducing measures
(which reduce the probability from p to p) may be useful.
(i) It is clear that the level of risk absent any measure (p) will differ
among various countries. This is so simply because of differences
in local conditions, so that some countries will be less exposed
to risk than others (for instance, because of different climatic
or geographical conditions). Plants and animals belonging to the
same family, as well as humans, may also differ in their suscepti-
bility to certain risk factors in different jurisdictions. It is known,
for example, that certain ethnicities are more susceptible to
particular diseases than are others.
One also expects that the risk-reducing measures necessary to
achieve a given level of desired risk (p) will differ among countries
for the same reasons. Indeed, Art. 2(2) does not, in and of itself,
demand or necessarily result in the harmonization of phytosanitary
measures across countries. For example, measures pertaining to
the type of packaging or treatment of foods necessary to ensure
those foods’ sanitary condition when put into the stream of
commerce might be perfectly safe for a cold climate and yet
unsafe for a warm climate, thus requiring different phytosanitary
regimes. Of course, the evaluation of risk in the absence of
measures, as well as the measures that are in place to reach the
desired level of risk, could be subject to dispute, without dis-
puting the standard of safety that the State wishes to afford for
its population. For instance, what may be contested and will
be in dispute is the extent to which the measure a State adopts
to ensure that standard of safety is necessary to achieve that
standard, given objective conditions affecting the control of
the risk in the importing country. It is assumed that both
the importing State and the exporting State have a shared
understanding of acceptable risk. It is also not disputed, as
might be the case, that the exporting country’s phytosanitary
regime covering the exports is appropriate for the conditions
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in the exporting country.6 What is claimed is that there are
objective circumstances that pertain in the importing country but
not in the exporting country, which render unsafe in the importing
country a product considered safe in the exporting country.
(ii) One can also expect that the desired (optimal) level of risk that
States will choose to support will differ. The optimal level of risk
will result from a tradeoff between the benefits of reducing risks
and the cost of risk-reducing measures. The willingness to pay
for risk-reducing measures will be determined by preferences,
in particular the degree of risk aversion, and resources (the budget
constraints that governments face). These factors will likely differ
from country to country. For instance, one expects that States
under stringent budget constraints will be less willing to pay for
a reduction of risk. Some societies have a greater awareness of, and
sensitivity to, ecological concerns than other societies. One notices
these differences in such mundane policies as roadside billboard
advertising, waste-disposal regimes, etc. Sometimes one observes
such different sensibilities even in matters of health and safety.
Policies towards airbags, seatbelts, and smoking differ from society
to society, indicating a complex set of different values reflective
of and constitutive of societal identity. One can imagine similar
differences in phytosanitary regulation areas. Certain medicines
are banned in some countries and not in others. Certain medicines
require a doctor’s prescription and a trained-pharmacist dispensing
service in some countries, but are sold over the counter in other
countries.
Local conditions will also affect the cost of risk-reducing
measures. Overall, one can thus expect some variance among
States in the optimal level of risk that they will choose to support.
(iii) As States can freely choose their optimal level of risk, nothing
would seem to prevent a State from selecting, in principle,
a level of zero risk (in the language of the AB itself), i.e. p ¼ 0.
However, one should not attach too much attention to this
possibility, for at least two reasons. First, as mentioned above, the
SPS agreement imposes a consistency requirement on measures
in different circumstances. Since the implementation of zero risk
6 There could, of course, be SPS disputes where the importing country challenges the
sufficiency of the measure even for the exporting country, or challenges the manner
in which the regime in the exporting country is administered.
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would entail a very great cost, which would have to be borne
in a variety of different circumstances, it is likely to be prohibitively
costly. Second, and more importantly, the notion of a ‘‘zero risk’’
level is an abstraction. It is really a limit case that may not matter
very much in practice. Whatever the protective measure in place,
it is likely that there will always be a strictly positive probability
that a bad outcome will prevail. From this perspective, referring
to a ‘‘de minimis’’ notion of risk may be better than employing
a notion of zero risk. A ‘‘de minimis’’ risk can be seen as a
risk that belongs to a small interval close to zero. The upper bound
of this interval could be defined as a level of risk so small that
it cannot be measurably affected by risk-reducing measures.
(iv) The task of the adjudicators is delicate; they will be confronted with
risk-reducing measures that are challenged. But they need to
distinguish between the level of risk that the States have chosen
(which cannot be challenged)  which is presumably ensured by
the risk-reducing measures under review  and the necessity of
the measures to achieve this level of risk.
Facts are often untidy. Consider the following situations.
Imagine two different regimes, under which the same medicine
might be permitted for over-the-counter sale in one of the
countries, but must be dispensed by an authorized pharmacist in
the other. This latter measure is being challenged. The adjudicator
will need to distinguish between the following hypotheses: first,
this may be an instance of differences in preferences that lead
to different optimal risks. If so, the measure should be considered
SPS-compliant. Second, it may very well be that the States have
the same optimal level of risk but that different risk-reducing
measures are necessary to achieve that level of risk in the two
countries (for instance, because the general public is less well-
educated in the latter). In this instance, the measure should also
be considered SPS-compliant. Third, it may very well be that
the States have the same optimal level of risk and that the risk-
reducing measures have the same effectiveness in the two countries.
In this instance, the stricter measure is not necessary and should
not be considered SPS-compliant.
(v) To ascertain the SPS compliance of contested phytosanitary mea-
sures requires an examination of whether the measures themselves
are necessary to ensure health and are based on, and maintained
with due regard to, scientific principles and evidence. If the
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measures themselves are based on scientific evidence and satisfy
all other requirements of the SPS discipline, the only question
will be whether they were applied correctly to any given import.
But SPS measures are almost invariably contested in the context
of a specific dispute where, as stated above, specific products
found safe and healthful in one jurisdiction are excluded from
another on the basis of a competing set of phytosanitary measures.
De facto, what the Panels typically end up doing, at least in part 
and Apples is a good example of this  is to examine whether or
not, on the basis of the evidence before them, the products in
question are ‘‘safe.’’ That is, in this case, whether or not the actual
apples exported to Japan posed a risk.
This approach may be appropriate if considered as a sufficient
condition to find that a measure is not SPS-compliant. Indeed, if
it is found that the level of risk, in the absence of any risk-reducing
measure, is ‘‘zero’’ or falls within a ‘‘de minimis’’ interval, then,
a fortiori, risk-reducing measures are not necessary. Any such measure
can be deemed non-SPS-compliant.7
However, this approach can easily descend into a challenge to the
level of risk that the State considers optimal. If we are correct in saying
that, in applying Art. 2 and its derivatives, the adjudicators end
up evaluating the risk-reducing measures’ compatibility with the SPS
by trying to assess whether or not the evidence adduced supports
the conclusion that the products in question are safe or unsafe, then
it can readily be seen how easy it could be to substitute, as the
critical test of safety and consequently of SPS compliance, the risk
sensibility of the adjudicator or of the expert witness for that of the
importing State.
Sometimes this result is due to a subconscious rejection of the full
implications of the regulatory autonomy granted to the States to set the
level of optimal risk. This unwillingness or subconscious rejection is
sustained, in part, by a certain ambivalence in the SPS toward the notion
of real, full autonomy: note, for example, how Art. 4 speaks of the
7 It could also be argued that evaluating whether there is credible scientific evidence to
demonstrate a health risk from the apples, the beef, or the salmon in question is the only
method of establishing whether in fact and in law the phytosanitary regulations in
question are themselves necessary for protection of health, based on scientific principle,
and, especially, supported (i.e. applied as in the contested case at hand) by sufficient
scientific evidence.
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‘‘appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection’’ (emphasis
added). Could this not be read as an invitation for the WTO adjudicator
to find that the level of protection itself (rather than the measure put
in place to ensure that level) is inappropriate?
Moreover, the vocabulary and, at times, the structure of scientific
risk assessment is often such that the distinction between the objective
prediction of probability and the value placed on such a prediction
is confused. The expert witness will be asked, or the scientific evidence
will be perused, to determine the degree of risk that the pathogen
will find its way into Japanese commerce, and the answer might be that
the risk is ‘‘negligible.’’ Strictly speaking, the scientific evidence should
restrict itself as much as possible to the quantification of probability
of an occurrence. But typically, experts will be invited to assess the
‘‘risk’’  an evaluation that might involve a combination of both the
scientific probability of an occurrence and a political determination
of acceptable danger. The lexical expression ‘‘negligible risk’’ might
thus constitute no more than a term for a very low probability, which
must then be evaluated in the context of the polity that is assessing
the risk. But the term might also fold into it that very value judgment:
so small, so negligible, that it is not worth bothering about. That
combined judgment is always part of a context that affects the value-
judgment element. To an expert from the wildflower-rich country of
Switzerland, the risk of contamination of a particular species of flora
is 1:10,000,000 and hence ‘‘negligible,’’ and not worth bothering
about. If that species were, however, the only species of its kind in
some other country, or if it were of considerable economic or cultural
significance, the very same probability of 1:10,000,000 might not seem
negligible at all.
Hence, the adjudicators  Panel and AB  might end up
pronouncing on the reasonableness of the standard of protection of
the importing State, rather than on the extent to which science
supports the conclusion that the products might compromise that
standard. Whereas the adjudicator may appropriately question the good
faith of the asserted standard, and whereas the SPS itself stipulates
certain conditions for consistency of risk within regulatory areas,
ultimately the question of determining the actual degree of risk
aversion is meant to be left to the State.
This potential slippage between issues is also important to the
extent that it affects certain perceptions and positions of both the
adjudicators and the parties. As regards the adjudicators, even though
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it is the AB’s decision at issue, the relationship between AB and Panel
in cases such as this is critical, since the findings as to whether the
measures in question are based on scientific principles and are
supported by sufficient scientific evidence are matters of fact to be
established by the Panel, they should be overturned only with difficulty,
and they are the basis on which the AB makes its own findings and
issues its Report.
4.2 The standard of review
The second issue concerns the standard of review that Panels should
adopt while examining SPS measures. In Hormones, the European
Communities drew a distinction between a ‘‘de novo’’ approach and
the unhappily termed ‘‘deference’’ approach.
In the view of the European Communities, the principal alternative
approaches to the problem of formulating the ‘‘proper standard of review’’
so far as Panels are concerned are two-fold. The first is designated as
‘‘de novo review.’’ This standard of review would allow a Panel complete
freedom to come to a different view than the competent authority of the
Member whose act or determination is being reviewed. A Panel would have
to ‘‘verify whether the determination by the national authority was
‘‘correct’’ both factually and procedurally.’’ The second is described as
‘‘deference.’’ Under a ‘‘deference’’ standard, a Panel, in the submission
of the European Communities, should not seek to redo the investigation
conducted by the national authority but instead examine whether
the ‘‘procedure’’ required by the relevant WTO rules had been followed.8
We do not believe that ‘‘deference’’ is a particularly useful term,
nor do we believe that the alternative to a de novo review is simply
a review of procedural propriety. Far more helpful are the distinctions
drawn in many national administrative- and constitutional-law systems,
where the review turns to the strictness of the scrutiny to be applied
to a measure. Typically, in judicial review of an administrative action,
the adjudicator does not seek to put himself or herself in the position
of the administrative authority (de novo review) but does more than
simply review procedural proprietary. The adjudicator will apply
some test of reasonableness. An adjudicator will overturn a measure
only if it was unreasonable (or even egregiously unreasonable) for an
administrative authority to decide as it has. By contrast, if the measure
8 Hormones, AB paragraph 111.
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in question threatened a fundamental value, such as a basic, protected
constitutional right, a much stricter scrutiny would be applied, seeking
a compelling reason to adopt the measure in question. The details differ
in different jurisdictions, but these kinds of underlying distinctions
are commonly found.
In Hormones, the AB gave a singularly unhelpful response to the
European Community’s contention, by stipulating a nebulous standard
based on Art. 11 of the DSU, which requires the Panels to base
their findings on an ‘‘objective assessment of the facts,’’ whatever that
may mean. The AB simply avoided the serious issue underlying the
EC submission. This response might have served in the context of a
predominantly discrimination-oriented regime ex GATT. But it cannot
serve in the differentiated WTO, which has, side by side, discrimination-
and obstacle-based disciplines. Article 11 is a catchall phrase that
would apply to all disputes and thus does not address what in our
minds is the real question. The prohibition against discrimination and
protectionism is arguably the most fundamental principle underlying
WTO trade disciplines. As such, when a State measure is discrimina-
tory and protectionist, one might argue that it should receive very
strict scrutiny with a high burden of justification on the State that
promulgates such a measure. By contrast, a nondiscriminatory SPS
measure, one might argue, is more akin to an administrative act, and
as such should be subject to a lower burden of justification. The failure
of the AB to deal seriously with this issue in Hormones did not make
it go away, as will be seen from our analysis of some of the central
issues in the case.
Particular concerns also arise when slippage occurs, namely when the
adjudicator, by evaluating the level of risk absent any measure, ends up
challenging the optimal risk chosen by the State (as discussed above).
Once the inquiry turns to the degree to which there is or is not
scientific evidence to impugn the safety of a product (as an indirect
method of evaluating SPS compliance of the State measure that
would exclude the product as unsafe), it is very easy to substitute one’s
own judgment for that of the administrative agency of the importing
State. ‘‘If,’’ the Panel implicitly reasons, ‘‘it has not been proven to our
satisfaction that there is sufficient scientific evidence to establish a real
danger, then ipso jure the State measure is not SPS-compliant.’’
The SPS, like the WTO and GATT more generally, is not altogether
helpful on the standard of review to be exercised in such cases.
Must it allow the State in question a margin of error? Should not the
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question be whether a reasonable government, in promulgating a certain
sanitary standard, reasonably come to the conclusion that measure X
is necessary to ensure sanitary and phytosanitary protection? This stan-
dard of review would mean that only unreasonable (rather than wrong)
measures would be struck down. By focusing on the product’s safety
as a means for determining the measure’s compliance with the SPS,
there is a risk of upsetting the apple cart, and of WTO Panels putting
themselves in the business of government, rather than in the business
of reviewing governance. The Panels end up applying a test that,
in most countries, administrative tribunals in similar situations would
consciously seek to avoid.
5 Risk assessment in Apples
In Apples, the Panel appears to have followed the very methodology
outlined above. Its inquiry into the compatibility of the phytosanitary
measures put in place by Japan became at its core an assessment
of the risk posed to Japan by apples imported from the United States.
In relation to each alleged risk, the Panel weighed the scientific
evidence presented by the parties as interpreted and augmented by the
consulted experts. Once the level of risk was established, it was used as
a yardstick to measure the compliance of the phytosanitary instruments
with the SPS.9
Sometimes the Panel’s factual conclusions were categorical:
We therefore conclude . . . that there is not sufficient scientific evidence
to conclude that mature, symptomless apples would harbour endophytic
populations of bacteria.10
On other occasions they were more nuanced:
We conclude . . . that, with respect to mature, symptomless apple fruit,
the risk that the transmission pathway be completed is ‘‘negligible.’’
Nevertheless, the experts consulted by the Panel, while firmly considering
that the transmission by mature apple fruit is unlikely, suggested . . . that
apples from severely blighted orchards . . . not be exported.11
One notes here the more qualified terms  ‘‘negligible’’ and ‘‘unlikely.’’
One also notes how the ‘‘experts,’’ and through them the Panel,
9 Sections 8.177 et seq. of Panel Report. 10 Section 8.128 of Panel Report.
11 Section 8.152 of Panel Report.
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end up engaging in the business of government, rather than review of
reasonableness of governance by government.
We therefore conclude that errors of handling or illegal actions are risks
that may be, in principle, legitimately considered by Japan. These risks
have been acknowledged by the experts, even though they consider them
to be ‘‘small’’ or ‘‘debatable.’’12
There would thus be a small risk that apples containing the fire blight
might enter the stream of commerce in Japan despite all precautions.
However, on the all-important issue of the existence of a transmission
vector from such apples to Japanese fruit, the Panel concluded that:
‘‘. . . the experts considered the completion of the pathway to be
unlikely.’’13
Of course, one should note, ‘‘unlikely’’ does not mean ‘‘impossible.’’
And the dispositive paragraph states as follows:
We therefore conclude . . . that it has not been established with sufficient
scientific evidence that the last stage of the pathway (i.e., transmission
of the fire blight to a host plant) would likely be completed.14
Ultimately, Japan’s claim fails on these findings. Since the risks
are minimal, the measures put in place by Japan can easily be found
to have no rational relationship to the available scientific evidence.15
In effect, the Panel did not hold that there was no risk; it held that
the risk was so small that it did not justify the measures.
One could interpret the Panel’s finding as suggesting that the risk
belonged to a ‘‘de minimis’’ interval. In this perspective, the Panel’s
approach and its conclusion that the measure cannot be SPS-compliant
would be appropriate.
However, one could certainly question whether the Panel established
that the risk fell within a ‘‘de minimis’’ interval. In particular, it is odd
that the Panel made a finding that apples from orchards with fire
blight should be excluded, even though there was no scientific basis
for this.
It is also striking that the Panel never wondered about the optimal
level of risk that Japan wanted to enforce. If it had indeed established
12 Section 8.161 of Panel Report. 13 Section 8.166 of Panel Report.
14 Section 8.168 of Panel Report. 15 Section 8.198 of Panel Report.
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that the level of risk absent any measure was within a ‘‘de minimis’’
interval, it would not matter. However, it would seem that it is the
Panel’s duty always to inform itself of the optimal level of risk that the
State has chosen. This seems essential in order to avoid confusing
the level of risk that the measure implies with the question of whether
the measure was necessary to achieve this chosen level of risk.
Once in the hands of the AB, given the factual nature of the findings,
there is not much the AB is willing or able to do. Thus, in Recital
163 of the AB Report we find:
As we see it, the Panel examined the evidence adduced by the parties
and considered the opinions of the experts. It concluded as a matter
of fact that it is not likely that apple fruit would serve as a pathway for
the entry, establishment or spread of fire blight in Japan.16 The Panel then
contrasted the extent of the risk and the nature of the elements composing
the measure, and concluded that the measure was ‘‘clearly dispro-
portionate to the risk identified on the basis of the scientific evidence
available.’’17 For the Panel, such ‘‘clear disproportion’’ implies that a
‘‘rational or objective relationship’’ does not exist between the measure
and the relevant scientific evidence, and, therefore, the Panel concluded
that the measure is maintained ‘‘without sufficient scientific evidence’’
within the meaning of Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement. We note that
the ‘‘clear disproportion’’ to which the Panel refers, relates to the appli-
cation in this case of the requirement of a ‘‘rational or objective
relationship between an SPS measure and the scientific evidence.’’
Further, what is not discussed in the case is the application of a
standard of review and, in particular, whether as a means for testing
SPS compliance one should adopt the approach discussed above: first
you check whether, procedurally and substantively, the sanitary and
phytosanitary rule was based on science and supported by sufficient
scientific evidence. You conduct this review in the manner in which,
for example, the French Constitutional Council reviews ex ante
legislation and not in the American ‘‘case and controversy’’ manner.
Then, if necessary, you review, in administrative-law fashion, whether
a reasonable state authority applying the rules, which have already
been found to be in and of themselves SPS-compliant, could reasonably
have reached the result in the specific case. Japan argued, artlessly, that
insufficient deference was given to its ‘‘approach’’ to scientific evidence,
16 Panel Report, para. 8.176. 17 Ibid., para. 8.198.
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a contention summarily rejected. Again, implicitly, the AB endorsed
the Panel’s methodology, which focused on the evaluation of risk,
with all the potential slippage that this methodology entails.
What is never addressed in the legal give-and-take is the weight
to be given to the experts’ assessment of small risk, likely and unlikely
risk, and negligible risk; and, more generally, what the upper bound
of the ‘‘de minimis’’ interval could be. There seems to be consensus that
there is some risk. What weight to be given to this amount of risk is a
matter that, one would have thought, should be contextualized. In the
assessment of Panel, one has the impression that, despite the existence
of some risk, a uniform regulatory rule would be applicable to all.
6 Consistency and discrimination
If one is to retain the current orthodoxy according to which, even under
the SPS, the Members enjoy autonomy to set their own levels of
acceptable risk, it is not, strictly speaking, the task of the Panels and
the AB to review that national policy decision. So long as the Members
adhere to the various disciplines of the SPS, notably that they engage
in an appropriate process of risk assessment and management and
that their determination of the risk and the measures to combat it
are based on scientific evidence, the review should stop there. The Panel
can review the measures for proportionality and hold incompatible
with the SPS those provisions that are ‘‘more trade-restrictive than
required to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary
protection.’’18 But what the ‘‘appropriate level’’ of protection is,
remains, according to the doctrine developed by the AB in Hormones
and Australian Salmon, a matter for each Member.
The Panels and the AB may, however, as part of their inherent
jurisdiction, review the good faith of these determinations by a State.
This is a very delicate task  it is never easy for an international tribunal
of any kind to base its decision and motivate its decision on the
ground of bad faith  that usually amounts to a finding that it simply
does not believe the State party in question. It would seem to us that
two interconnected devices may render this task somewhat easier.
In the first place, Members in SPS cases should be prodded by
the Panels to articulate the level of risk against which the measures
18 SPS Article 5(6).
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in question are designed. In fact, it is difficult to understand how
a Member can engage in the kind of risk assessment required by
Art. 5 SPS without such an articulation. An inability to articulate the
level of risk, even if not in precise quantitative terms, may have
significant probative value in indicating that the required risk
assessment ex Art. 5 was deficient. In addition, it would be the only
way for the Panel to do what falls to it, which is to review whether the
measures adopted are indeed scientifically grounded and necessary to
ensure or mitigate against the risk level so articulated. In this regard, we
respectfully disagree with the ruling of the AB in Hormones, in which it
held that:
[t]o the extent that the Panel purported to require a risk assessment
to establish a minimum magnitude of risk, we must note that imposition
of such a quantitative requirement finds no basis in the SPS Agreement19
The AB may not find an explicit basis in the Agreement, but without
some indication of the magnitude of risk aimed at, both Panel and
AB risk descending into intuitive approximations.
Members might, of course, put the cart before the horse: examine
the measures they have in place and construct from them, retro-
actively, the level of risk that supposedly informed the choice of the
measure in question. This is where the second ‘‘bad faith’’ device may be
employed. It is permissible to check the autonomous determination of
the level of risk against the requirement of consistency in Art. 5(5) SPS.
With the objective of achieving consistency in the application of the
concept of appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection
against risks to human life or health, or to animal and plant life or health,
each Member shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the
levels it considers to be appropriate in different situations, if such dis-
tinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on interna-
tional trade. Members shall cooperate in the Committee, in accordance
with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 12, to develop guidelines to further
the practical implementation of this provision. In developing the guide-
lines, the Committee shall take into account all relevant factors, includ-
ing the exceptional character of human health risks to which people
voluntarily expose themselves.
In Hormones, the Panel gave a rather narrow definition to the mean-
ing of ‘‘different situations,’’ construing the terms to apply to risks
19 Hormones, AB 186.
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resulting from the ‘‘same substance’’ and creating the ‘‘same adverse
health effects.’’20 This would be of limited utility in this dispute, since
it is the very absence of fire blight in Japan that informed its measure.
Article 5.5 could, however, be read to apply to situations in, for example,
a similar sector (in this case safety of plant life,) assuming that all other
things are more or less equal. If, for example, as in this case, it were
found that Japan insisted on a very low tolerance to risk in relation
to fire blight, but in other comparable situations was willing to tolerate
far higher levels of risk to the health of plant life, one might be justified
in drawing the conclusion, absent a convincing justification from
Japan, that its measure was a disguised restriction on trade and hence
non-SPS-compliant. The Panel specifically stated in Hormones that
its ruling there should not be seen as either defining or ‘‘further
limiting’’ the meaning of the term ‘‘different situation’’ in Art. 5.5.
And the AB confirmed a broader approach:
Clearly, comparison of several levels of sanitary protection deemed
appropriate by a Member is necessary if a Panel’s inquiry under
Article 5.5 is to proceed at all. The situations exhibiting differing levels of
protection cannot, of course, be compared unless they are comparable,
that is, unless they present some common element or elements sufficient
to render them comparable. If the situations proposed to be examined are
totally different from one another, they would not be rationally com-
parable and the differences in levels of protection cannot be examined
for arbitrariness.21
It is to be noted, however, that one cannot apply the consistency
clause in the manner suggested above in an overly rigid or mechan-
ical manner. One cannot impugn a set level of risk simply and only
because one finds that the State is not consistent in related fields.
If this were so, State measures affecting imported products would
always have to be pitched at the very lowest standard tolerated in
the importing State, militating against, for example, a progressive rais-
ing of standards. Article 5.5 should not be construed as a mechanism
that would force harmonization to the bottom. But the language of
the provision  each Member shall avoid arbitrary and unjustifiable
distinctions  could be comfortably used to reject abusive standards
without compromising the regulatory autonomy of the State under
orthodox understanding. If the State could not explain the maintenance
20 Hormones, Panel 8.176. 21 Hormones, AB 217.
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of such distinctions, there would be a means of finding them
incompatible with SPS without expressly impugning the good faith
of the State. We would like to emphasize that the consistency require-
ment should not necessarily be seen as a device aimed at uncovering
crypto-protectionism. Unjustifiable distinctions can eradicate not
only the purposively abusive SPS measure but also the unthinking,
careless measures that are detrimental to trade without a real social
justification. It is important to note that, according to Art. 5.5, arbitrary
or unjustified distinctions are impugned not only if they result
in discrimination but also if they result in a disguised restriction on
trade. In the context of SPS, a disguised restriction on trade need not
be in the context of a protectionist scheme.
The principal innovation of SPS was the introduction of a
legal discipline that was not rooted in protectionism. A State measure
may be found to be SPS-noncompliant even if, as in Apples, there
is no finding of protectionism and discrimination. As noted by the
AB in Hormones, a State measure may be found to be GATT-compliant
(i.e. not in violation of, for example, Arts. III and XI) and yet still
be noncompliant with SPS. At the same time, a measure that is
discriminatory or protectionist is, ipso jure, also in violation of the
SPS. We have argued in this essay that measures which are putatively
discriminatory and protectionist merit stricter scrutiny by the adjudi-
cators, and the burden of justification on the State employing them
should, necessarily, be higher than in a situation where the disputed
measures are not alleged to be discriminatory or protectionist.
If this is so, this would, in the context of SPS, produce a certain
legal paradox, the implications of which can only be sorted out as the
jurisprudence develops. Imagine two states applying an SPS measure
identical to the one we find in Apples. In State A, there is very little
production of the product in question and, let us stipulate, the
economics of the market are such that protectionism is neither the
object nor the effect of the measure in question. In State B there is,
by contrast, significant production of the product in question, and
the effect of the SPS measure in question is to afford protection and
raise suspicion as to the aim of the measure. It would seem that the
measure in State B would, and perhaps should, receive stricter scrutiny.
Assume further that the measure is ‘‘truly’’ compliant. The result could
be that, since State A had a lower burden of justification, its SPS
measure would be found not to violate the Agreement, whereas State B,
with the higher burden of justification, might find its measure
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impugned. Hence, the same measure would be SPS-compliant in one
country but not in the other. This may be a source of concern in the
following sense: State B’s measure appears more suspect because of
the protective effect. But at the same time, precisely because State B
has significant production of the product in question, the consequences
of contamination could be much more devastating than in State A,
yet State B, with the higher level of risk, ends up with the higher burden
of justification and the greater risk of having its measure impugned.22
This anomaly may be used as an argument against a thesis that
would differentiate the burden of justification based on the factors of
protectionism and discrimination. But that, in turn, militates against
a principle of judicial review, found in most jurisdictions, according
to which a public measure that violates a fundamental norm should
receive a higher level of scrutiny.
7 Risk assessment
Whilst acknowledging that the Japanese risk-assessment exercise
studied several possible hosts of fire blight, including the apple fruit,
the Panel then found that the risk assessment was not ‘‘sufficiently
specific’’ because the conclusion of the assessment did not purport to
relate exclusively to the introduction of the disease through apple fruit,
but rather more generally, apparently, through any susceptible host/
vector. As the AB explained, the Panel also ‘‘found the discussion
of possible pathways to have ‘intertwined’ the risk of entry through
apple fruit with that of other possible vectors, including vectors
considered more likely to be potential sources of contamination than
apple fruit,’’ and hence more damaging. Finally, although the assessment
noted the possibility of entry, establishment, or spread of fire blight
through this vector, it did not properly evaluate the probability of
the occurrence of such events. The result was to invalidate the risk
assessment conducted by Japan.
For Japan, the issue was one of methodology in which Members
should enjoy discretion provided that the risk could be established.
The AB solidly upheld the Panel and insisted, following its ruling
in Hormones, that the assessment would have to follow the potential
22 Of course, because of more damaging consequences, country B may wish to select
a lower level of optimal risk. Assuming, however, that both countries have selected
a ‘‘de minimis’’ risk, the anomaly will remain.
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specific pathogens of the disease, and that these would have to be
assessed in relation to the contemplated SPS measure in question.
We do not propose to critique in this piece this reasoning of the AB,
except to note that the pattern which now emerges from several SPS
cases suggests that, absent an international standard that a State might
follow, it will be rather difficult for all countries, and notably developing
countries, to conduct the kind of risk assessment that would satisfy
the stringent methodological requirements stipulated by the AB.
The legal issue concerned here also goes to the standard of review,
which likewise is more assumed than discussed. On the one hand, the
AB seems to suggest that there is plenty of leeway for alternative
methodologies. Thus, in Recital 204 we read:
Contrary to Japan’s submission, however, the Panel’s reading of EC 
Hormones does not suggest that there is an obligation to follow any
particular methodology for conducting a risk assessment. In other words,
even though, in a given context, a risk assessment must consider
a specific agent or pathway through which contamination might occur,
Members are not precluded from organizing their risk assessments
along the lines of the disease or pest at issue, or of the commodity to be
imported. Thus, Members are free to consider in their risk analysis
multiple agents in relation to one disease, provided that the risk
assessment attributes a likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of
the disease to each agent specifically. Members are also free to follow
the other ‘‘methodology’’ identified by Japan and focus on a particular
commodity, subject to the same proviso.
This passage suggests a reasonableness standard rather than a categorical
one. But this seems to be negated by the categorical manner in which
Japan is to follow the Australia Salmon test of 5.1.23 We do not want
to suggest here that the AB was necessarily wrong from a legal point of
view. But it does tip the scales considerably against poorer and less
23 . . .a risk assessment within the meaning of Art. 5.1 must:
(1) identify the diseases whose entry, establishment or spread a Member wants to prevent
within its territory, as well as the potential biological and economic consequences
associated with the entry, establishment or spread of these diseases;
(2) evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases, as well as the
associated potential biological and economic consequences; and
(3) evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases according
to the SPS measures which might be applied. (original italics) (Recital 121 Australia
Salmon).
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scientifically equipped and sophisticated Members. The powerful
Members seem to get at least two, if not three, bites at this apple.
First, they will have much greater clout when negotiating international
standards, which then will be de facto imposed on less powerful
Members. Second, it will be difficult for less powerful Members to
match the powerful Members’ scientific apparatus when their regimes
come into conflict. And finally, the powerful Members will, of course,
have more resources to attempt to extricate themselves from an
uncomfortable international standard.
8 The precautionary principle
We have assumed so far that probabilities can be attached to future
events. This assumption arises when the mechanisms through which,
for instance, a disease can spread are well understood and when
the circumstances affecting the spread of the disease can be observed.
Hence, the likelihood of each possible outcome can be estimated
with confidence. By contrast, a disease may be poorly understood, and
there may be competing theories regarding its development, with no
evidence to support one or the other. Accordingly, there may be
several probability distributions over possible events, depending on
which theory is used.24 As indicated above, there is no scientific
explanation behind the spread of the fire blight across the ocean,
so this may be such an instance.
Before discussing how the SPS agreement considers such cases
and discussing the approach of the Panel, some insight from decision
theory on how to proceed under these two sets of circumstances may
be useful. In other words, should the uncertainty surrounding the
evaluation of probabilities affect decisions?
8.1 Risk and ambiguity
The work of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) has shown
that when an objective probability distribution can be defined over
a set of outcomes, preferences will be linear in probabilities, at least
as long as they respect the ‘‘independence axiom.’’ That is also to
24 Taking it for granted that there is no likelihood that can be attached to possible
probability distribution. If it were the case, they could be aggregated to yield one
distribution.
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say that decisions can be formulated as the result of the maximization
of expected utility.
Savage (1956) considered a situation where the decision-maker
cannot rely on objective probability distribution. He considered a set of
possible events and analyzed the choices that an individual would make
over alternative gambles that yield different payoffs in these events.
He assumed that the individual would always be able to make a
choice. He further assumed that the choice between two gambles would
not be affected by a modification of the payoffs that accrue when
both gambles yield the same payoff (the independence axiom again).
For instance, assume that there are two events, H and L, which are
not exhaustive, so that Non H and Non L can also arise. The first gamble
yields a payoff of 1 if H occurs and 0 if L occurs. The second
gamble yields 0 if H occurs and 1 if L occurs. Both gambles give a payoff
of ‘‘d ’’ if neither H nor L occurs. The independence axiom says that
a change in ‘‘d ’’ should not change the choice between the two gambles.
Savage showed that from the observation of choices made under
these assumptions,25 one could generate a relationship between events
that is nothing but a subjective probability relationship (such that events
could be ordered as more or less probable).
This finding has an important consequence: it says that when no
underlying probability distribution is available, preferences will be
linear in subjective probabilities. Decisions can be formulated as the
maximization of subjective expected utility. This also implies that, faced
with alternative probability distribution over a set of events, a decision-
maker should pick one and behave as if the resulting probabilities
were certain.
To illustrate, consider the following experiment, by Ellsberg (1961).
There are two urns, each with 100 balls, which can be either red
or black. In Urn 1, the proportion is unknown. For Urn 2, it is known
that there are 50 red and 50 black balls. An agent is asked to choose
between the following bets: bet red, in which case he gets a prize
if a red ball is extracted and zero otherwise; or bet black, in which case
he gets a prize if a black ball is extracted and zero otherwise. Consider,
first, possible bets over Urn 2. Agents will naturally be indifferent
as to betting red or black. Asked the same question of Urn 1, agents
will typically provide the same answer. This can be seen as a situation
25 And a couple of additional technical assumptions.
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where there are 101 possible theories about the allocation of balls in the
Urn. Agents form the subjective assessment that, in the absence of any
information to distinguish among the theories, they are all equally
likely, and hence attach a subjective probability of 0.5 that a red
(or black) ball will be extracted from Urn 1.
In this framework, there is thus nothing special about scientific
uncertainty. Precaution is just like protection: optimal risk-reduction
efforts can be obtained from a standard cost-benefit analysis (see Gollier,
2001, for a discussion), using subjective probabilities.
Some suspicion about the validity of the framework, however, arises
if agents in the example above are asked an additional question,
namely whether they prefer to bet red for Urn 1 or bet red for Urn 2.
It turns out that most agents prefer to bet red for Urn 2, rather than
bet red for Urn 1. This implies that red from Urn 2 is perceived as
more likely than red from Urn 1. But if an agent also prefers to bet
black for Urn 2 rather than black for Urn 1, non-red from Urn 2 would
appear more probable than non-red from Urn 1. This is inconsistent
with the notion that the choice of agents reveals probabilities. That is
also to say that choices cannot be compared according to their expected
utility. As shown by Ellsberg (1961), the problem arises because the
axiom of independence is violated.
This experiment indicates that some agents may be ready to pay
more for reducing a risk that is more uncertain. Alternative models
of decision have also been developed that do not rely on the axiom
of independence. For instance, Henry and Henry (2003) describe
a model26 in which agents face different probability distributions
over a set of events. Uncertainty is thus described in terms of a family
of distributions. In their framework, choices cannot be compared
in terms of expected utility (independence is not assumed) but can be
compared in terms of a weighted average of the maximum and the
minimum of expected utility that obtains across the possible probability
distributions. This allows for a representation of preferences in terms
of an attitude to risk (the usual risk aversion as depicted by the
shape of the utility function) and an attitude toward the uncertainty
with respect to the true probability distribution, which is referred to
as the degree of aversion toward ambiguity. The latter is represented
26 Originally developed by Ghirardato et al. (2002).
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by the weights that are given respectively to the maximum and the
minimum of expected utility.27
Finally, it is worth noting that the decisions that agents take
in this framework can also be seen as displaying some ‘‘precaution.’’
The aversion of the agents to ambiguity leads them to take some
actions in which they give some weight to worst theories.
8.2 Risk, ambiguity, and precaution in the SPS agreement
As discussed above, the AB confirmed that Japan’s phytosanitary
measures were maintained ‘‘without sufficient scientific evidence’’
and hence the measures were not in conformity with Art. 2.2 of the
SPS agreement. At the same time, the AB ruled that the phytosanitary
measures imposed by Japan were ‘‘not imposed in respect of
a situation where relevant scientific evidence [was] insufficient,’’ so
that temporary measures could not be justified under Art. 5.7. The
AB noted in particular that the Panel had come across an important
amount of relevant evidence and that ‘‘a large quantity of high quality
scientific evidence . . . had been produced over the years and . . . that
the experts had expressed increasing confidence in this evidence.’’
Altogether, the AB thus seems to have considered (i) that there is reliable
scientific evidence on the risks involved in the spread of the disease
at stake, and (ii) that the evidence confirmed that the risk of having
the disease spread through imported apples was small.
Importantly, the AB also reiterated the Panel’s observation that
Art. 5.7 ‘‘was designed to be invoked in situations where little, or no,
reliable evidence was available on the subject matter at issue.’’
It is striking that the structure of the SPS agreement, as well as
the interpretation of the agreement given by the AB (and Panel), fit with
the distinction between risk and ambiguity. It appears in particular
that Art. 5.7 can be used when ambiguity is strong.
The ‘‘sufficiency of scientific evidence’’ in Art. 2.2. and the
‘‘(in)sufficiency of relevant scientific evidence’’ in Art. 5.6 thus also
appear to refer to different concepts. The use of similar terms could
be confusing, and these concepts could be spelled out more clearly.
The structure of the test as to whether a measure would be allowed
27 For instance, the max-min criteria proposed by Gilboa and Schneider (1989) (such that
individuals should behave as if the true theory is the one that yields the lowest expected
utility) can be shown to display a strong aversion to ambiguity (see Henry, 2002).
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could also be clarified: following the terms of the discussion above,
a restrictive measure could be allowed if uncertainty could not be
confidently characterized in terms of a probability distribution.
If uncertainty could be confidently characterized in terms of proba-
bility distribution, a restrictive measure might still be allowed if it
significantly reduced the occurrence of an event that, according to this
probability distribution, is sufficiently likely and sufficiently damaging.
Hence, it would appear that any test of whether a measure could be
lawful should start with Art. 5.7 (and not Art. 2.2) and question
the ambiguity of scientific evidence. A precise evaluation of the measure
at stake (under Art. 2.2) would be conducted only if it were concluded
that scientific evidence was sufficiently ‘‘unambiguous.’’
The question of how ambiguity should be measured in practice in
cases where consensus cannot be detected is, however, difficult. It would
presumably involve a measure of the subset of possible events for which
probabilities are (dis-)similar under the range of possible distributions
put forward by experts.
The previous discussion indicates that Art. 5.7 of the SPS agreement
can be seen as the expression of a precautionary principle. However,
it reflects a particular motive for precaution, namely the presence of
ambiguity. Yet, as discussed by Gollier (2001), there are other possible
justifications for precautionary actions, and those are not explicitly
mentioned in this provision.28
These other justifications arise in particular from the dynamic
nature of scientific uncertainty. When future risks depend on past
consumption (as in the case of climate change), the question arises
whether preventive efforts should be undertaken today or tomorrow.
On the face of it, the expectation that knowledge will improve over time,
and hence that actions will be more efficient in the future, would
appear to caution against premature actions. This is the argument that
is often advanced to justify the US refusal to sign the Kyoto protocol.
It is what Gollier refers to as the ‘‘learn, then act’’ principle. However,
if knowledge is improved through the observation of the risks
themselves, matters may be different. In those circumstances, the
observation of damages today should lead to more preventive actions.
28 Gollier (2001) uses the subjective expected-utility framework. However, the dynamic
effects that he investigates would appear to apply in other frameworks, at least at the
level of general principles.
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Second, it may be that postponing preventive actions will also
increase future risks; in those circumstances, the prospect of being
poorer in the future may lead to a reduction in the amount of pollution
today.
Third, the extent to which current decisions change flexibility in
the future may also be a concern. Some risks may be subject to
irreversibilities, and the lack of preventive measures may reduce the
options in the future. In other words, there may be an option value
in undertaking preventive action, which in principle can be estimated
using real option theory.
Hence, the question arises whether the SPS agreement should not
reflect those particular circumstances when precautionary actions are
particularly appropriate, namely when future risks are increased,
flexibility is impaired, and learning proceeds by observation of current
trends.
8.3 Precaution in Japan  Apples ?
As discussed above, the Panel and the AB ruled that the phytosanitary
measures imposed by Japan were ‘‘not imposed in respect of a situation
where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient,’’ so that temporary
measures could not be justified under Art. 5(7). Still, the absence of
scientific explanation behind the spread of fire blight across the ocean
may be an instance of ambiguity.
Apples is thus a good illustration of the rather constricted nature
of Art. 5(7) as an expression of a broader and more capacious notion
of precaution. For example, there is, on the one hand, considerable
scientific evidence on the mechanisms that explain the potential
transmission mechanisms of fire blight. On the other hand, there
is no accepted, consensus account that actually tracks and explains
how fire blight traveled across the oceans to reach Australia or certain
Asian countries. A capacious notion of precaution might suggest that,
pending the discovery of the actual transoceanic pathway, a State may
be entitled to invoke Art. 5(7).
This raises a question of framing. If you frame the question as to
the ‘‘macro’’ pathway in its historical context, one would be driven
to the conclusion that there was no scientific evidence. If, by contrast,
you frame the question as to the specific mechanisms that explain how
the pathogen might migrate from a blighted apple to a healthy one,
there is evidence. It is not clear why, in this case, the second framework
is more appropriate than the first one. Once again, we come back
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to the all-important issue of the standard of review. Had the Panel
taken the view that its task was not to establish the risk posed by
imported apples, but to establish the reasonableness of the Japanese
measure and the circumstances of its application to the specific imports
from the United States, it would also have asked itself whether it
was reasonable for the Japanese government to look, in the context
of 5(7), at the first rather than the second framework, as articulated
above. Because the Panel slipped into the business of risk assessment
itself, rather than assessment of risk assessment, it could come to its
conclusion, which the AB uncritically followed.
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